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Abstract
Using the sparse grid, we solve a DSGE model where there are two types of electronic money: reserves
(e-money that is issued by the central bank for banks) and zero maturity deposits (e-money that is issued
by banks). Transactions between bankers are settled by reserves, while transactions in the non-bank private
sector are settled by zero maturity deposits. We use our model to discuss about unconventional monetary
policy tools during the Great Recession. Due to the maturity mismatch between deposits and loans, we find
that keeping the federal funds rate at the lower bound for a long but finite time stimulates the economy in
the short run but creates deflation and lower outputs in the long run. To get out of the zero lower bound, the
central bank can conduct helicopter money and increase the interest rate paid on reserves simultaneously,
which is impossible in the Keynesian theory, but possible with the current electronic money system.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, money mostly exists in the electronic form. According to the data from the Federal Reserve
Bank, the total stock of M1 in Jun 2016 is around USD 3274 billion, consisting of USD 1381 billion in
currency and USD 1850 billion in checkable deposits. However, as the world currency, most US dollar bills
are held outside US. Judson (2012) estimates that 60 percent of US dollar bills are in foreign countries.
If we exclude that number from M1 and M2, currency only accounts for 15 percent of the M1 stock and
5 percent of the M2 stock. Moreover, the value of transactions conducted by currency is far less than the
ones with electronic money. Schreft and Smith (2000), based on the “Nilson Report 1997”, shows that cash
accounts for 20 percent of the dollar volume of U.S. payments made by consumers in 1990 and 18 percent
in 1996, and is projected to account for only 16 percent in 2000 and 12 percent in 2005. In this paper, we
focus on a particular group of e-money issued by commercial banks, including checkable deposits, money
market deposit account and saving account. For convenience, we call this group as zero-maturity deposits
(ZMDs) thereafter.
ZMDs are different from currency in two salient features. First, in nature, currency is an IOU issued by
the central bank while ZMDs are IOUs issued by commercial banks. In economic terms, currency is outside
money while ZMDs are inside money. Second, unlike currency, ZMDs pay the (positive) nominal interest
rate. Banks pay the interest rate for saving account and money market deposits account for a long time, but
the tricky part is the checking account. In a frictionless perfectly competitive banking market, the interest
rate on checkable deposits should be positive and follow the federal funds rate. However, before 2012,
under the Regulation Q, banks in US were prohibited from paying interest on checking account. During
this period, banks still implicitly paid the demand deposit rate under the form of giving gifts or reducing
the cost of additional services to their customers, see Mitchell (1979), Startz (1979), Dotsey (1983). Becker
(1975) estimates that the implicit demand deposit rate in US during 1960-1968 was around 2.64 percent-
3.74 percent.
Since 2012, the Regulation Q has been no longer valid, and most banks are now paying interest rate on
the checkable deposits (see Table 8 in Appendix A). According to the data in September 2016 of Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the national average interest on checkable account is 0.04 percent,
on saving account is 0.06 percent. These rates are low as the federal funds rate is near zero. If the federal
funds rate is around 4 percent, these rates are likely from 1 percent to 2 percent. As a result of that, in
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the era of electronic money, it is more natural to model money as an interest-earning asset. Even during
the period of 2000-2012, as the popularity of credit cards and Internet banking helped people to conduct
transaction even with only saving account, it is more reasonable to model that households earn interest rate
from holding ZMDs.
This paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model where currency does not exist. There are two
forms of money in our model: reserves and ZMDs. In our model, ZMDs are inside money issued by the
commercial banks. They are used for settling the transactions between every pair of agents in the economy,
except between bankers-bankers, bankers-government, and bankers-central bank. In these types of transac-
tions, bankers have to use reserves- another type of e-money that commercial banks deposit at the central
bank. Only government and commercial banks have an account at the central bank. The amount of ZMDs
banks can issue is restricted by two constraints: the reserves requirement and the capital requirement. In our
model, the central bank only controls the level of reserves while the level of money supply (total amount of
ZMDs) depends on the interaction between the central bank, the commercial banks and the public. In the
normal time when the reserves requirement is binding, by adjusting the level of reserves, the central bank
can target the interbank lending rate; and therefore the prime rate that banks lend out to households. In the
situation when the reserves requirement is not binding, the central bank can control the interbank lending
rate by adjusting the interest rate paid on reserves.
We use our theory to set lights on what happened in the Great Recession. Banks, in our model, hold an
asset related to the construction sector. When a big negative housing demand shock is realized, the price
of this asset drops. Bankers fire-sell this asset to satisfy the capital constraint, which further pushes down
its price. Consequently, bankers’ net worth decline to a new level that they need to cut loans to satisfy the
capital requirement constraint. The level of ZMDs declines even though the level of reserves go up. As
the price of loan is higher and the deflation episode is realized, the private investment declines strongly. If
the central bank only follows the conventional monetary policy where they purchase the small amount of
government bond from bankers to inject reserves, the recession will be severe. It takes a long time for the
loan market to be back into the normal mode.
Even though the only shock in our model comes from the households’ demand side, it does not affect the
household directly, but rather indirectly through the banking sector. When banks cut loans, the total amount
of money in the economy declines. As households need money in advance to purchase the final good and
make investment, the tighter of liquidity constraint forces them to cut down the level of investment sharply.
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Moreover, unlike the story in the collateral constraint1 households want to sell house more quickly to relax
their liquidity constraint, which in turn, pushes down the housing price further and amplified the initial
housing demand shock.
We discuss in detail the unconventional monetary policy2 when the central bank changes the component
of its balance sheet by purchasing the distressed assets rather than the government bonds. This program,
through the asset price channel, immediately pushes the commercial banks out of the capital constraint and
recover the credit flows between households and bankers. In the short run, this unconventional monetary
policy can prevent the prolonged deflation episode. However, in the medium run, without adjusting the
interest rate paid on reserves, deflation might happen as the result of keeping the interbank rate at the lower
bound for too long.
The intuition for the mechanism why deflation might happen in the medium run after the quantitative
easing (QE) can be explained by the mismatch between the maturity of money and loans in our model.
Bankers know that in the long run, the federal funds rate will be back to the steady state level, so when
making a long term loan, they have to take into account this effect into the current loan rate. If the central
bank keep the federal funds rate at the lower bound, the nominal deposit rate is also at the lower bound,
while the real loan rate might start rising if bankers know the rate will rise in the future. In equilibrium,
the real return on deposits will be equal to the real loan rate minus the liquidity premium. If the liquidity
premium does not change much, the deflation must realize to increase the real return on deposits to match
it up with the real loan rate.
The recommended policy for the central bank is to raise the interest rate paid on reserves on the exit
date from the zero lower bound, even if the central bank does not see the inflation signal. When the central
bank raises the federal funds rate, the deflation goes down further but it will pick up quickly as the nominal
interest rate on deposits start matching up with the real loan rate. To reduce the negative effect of temporary
rise in the federal funds rate, the Fed can use the helicopter money simultaneously. This policy is impossible
to conduct in the Keynesian theory, but is totally possible with the electronic money.
Our model can generate some key facts in the Great Recession: (i) the level of reserves skyrockets but
the money multiplier plummets, (ii) the interbank rate is equal to the interest rate paid on reserves for a
1If housing is in the collateral constraint, in the model without default, the price of housing will recover quickly as the shadow
price of the collateral constraint pushes up the housing price
2In many contexts, it is called “quantitative easing” (QE) in our paper, even though our model does not examine the situation
when the central bank purchases the massive amount of government bonds.
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long time after the quantitative easing, (iii) the deleveraging process when banks actively cut loans, (iv)
the sharp cut of investment and outputs at the beginning of the housing crisis, (v) the sharp decline then
suddenly increase again of the inflation in only two quarters. Indeed, the last fact is the challenging to any
New Keynesian model to generate.
The are two main challenges in the computation method for our model. First, our model features the
three occasionally binding constraints, where the switch between reserves requirement and capital require-
ment play the key role. Second, our model has six state variables, one of which is the aggregate reserves
level. The level of reserves can be nearly five times as high as its steady state level in the simulation, creat-
ing the difficulty for building a good grid. To conduct the quantitative exercise, we build a Smolyak grid in
Brumm and Scheidegger (2015) and use the nonlinear certainty equivalent (NLCEQ) approximation method
in Cai, Judd and Steinbuks (2015) to estimate the decision rule. This global solution method is stable and
can handle three occasionally binding constraints in our model. For each point in the grid, NLCEQ uses it
as the initial state and transforms our stochastic problem into a deterministic problem. For large shock, to
solve the deterministic system, we also combine NLCEQ with the continuation method.
Related Literature
On the money supply side, our approach is similar to Bianchi and Bigio (2014) and Afonso and Lagos
(2015) when the central bank can increase the level of money supply and cut down the federal funds rate
by injecting more reserves in the banking system. These papers explicitly model the search and matching
process of heterogeneous agents in the interbank market while the one in our model is frictionless with
identical bankers. In exchange of that, our model can connect the central bank policy to not only banks’
balance sheet but also the production sector, which is missing in both Bianchi and Bigio (2014) and Afonso
and Lagos (2015).
On the money demand side, our model follows the cash-in-advance literature. As our model does not
have currency, “cash” here should be interpreted as ZMDs. In Belongia and Ireland (2006, 2014), currency
and deposits are bundled together and provide the liquidity service to households. Our deposits, however,
are zero maturity deposits. Like Lucas and Stokey (1987), households need money in advance to purchase
the consumption good. Even though money in our model earns the positive interest rate, its rate of return
is still less than the rate they borrow from bankers. We also extend the Clower constraint to the investment
and housing purchases (Stockman (1981), Abel (1985), Fuerst (1992), Wang and Wen (2006)). Indeed,
most empirical research, for example Friedman (1959) and Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin (1997), usually uses
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the income, rather than the consumption alone, to estimate the money demand function. The appearance
investment in the Clower constraint is important to generate the persistence of output and deflation.
We also share the sticky price feature with the New Keynesian framework. The important role of finan-
cial frictions in the New Keynesian has been emphasized for a long time (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999), Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004)). Recently, many New Keynesian research (Gertler and Kiy-
otaki (2010), Curdia and Woodford (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011)) incorporates the banking sector to
their models, aiming to answer what happened in the Great Recession and the role of the unconventional
monetary policy, Our paper differs mainly from these line of research in the money supply process. We
can characterize the micro-foundation link between reserves, banks’ balance sheets, money supply and the
federal funds rate; hence, our model can exhibit the long duration of federal funds rate at the lower bound
after quantitative easing while this link is often missing in the New Keynesian literature. Moreover, the New
Keynesian often focuses on the interest rate channel, while the unconventional monetary policy in the Great
Recession inclines to the asset price channel and bank lending channel. Our model, somehow, can exhibit
all of those channels in a succinct framework.
Our approach also relates to a large literature in macro-finance where macro shocks can affect strongly
to the balance sheets of intermediaries. Both Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016) and our model emphasize
the importance of inside money in the deflation episode. Both show the intermediaries cut the amount of
inside money they issue during the time their net worth decline, leading to the sharp decline in the money
multiplier during the crisis. However, two papers differ mainly in the role of money and the money supply
process. There is no reserves and two-tier money in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016). Moreover they em-
phasize the role of storing value in money while our paper focus on the function as the medium of exchange
in money. Gertler and Karadi (2011), He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Caballero and Simsek (2013) also
show the circumstances when intermediaries fire sell their risky assets under the capital constraint, which is
also found in our paper.
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2 The Environment
2.1 Notation:
Let Pt be the price level (price of the final consumption good), we use the lower letter to exhibit the real
balance of a variable or its relative price. For example, the real reserves balance nt = Nt/Pt , or the real price
of pmt = P
m
t /Pt . The timing notation follows this rule: If a variable is determined or chosen at time t, it will
have the subscript t. All of the interest rates in the model are gross nominal rates, except when explicitly
stated differently. The gross inflation rate is pit = Pt/Pt−1.
2.2 Time, Demographics and Preferences
Time is discrete, indexed by t and continues forever. The economy has seven types of agents: bankers,
households, wholesale firms, retail firms, construction firms, the government and the central bank.
There is a measure one of identical infinitely lived bankers in the economy. Bankers discount the future
with the rate β . Each period, they gain utility from consuming the final consumption good ct . Their expected
utility at the period t can be written as:
Et
[
∞
∑
i=0
β i log(ct+i)
]
There is also a measure one of identical infinitely lived households. Households discount the future with
the rate β˜<β , so they will borrow from the bankers. Each period, households gain utility from consuming
the final consumption good ct and enjoying the flow of housing service from the housing stock ht . However,
they lose utility when providing labor l˜t to their own production. Household’s expected utility at the period
t can be written as:
Et
[
∞
∑
i=0
β˜ i
(
log(c˜t+i)+ξt log(h˜t+i)−χ
l˜1+ηt+i
1+η
)]
where ξt is time-varying housing demand shock and η is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Wholesale firms, retail firms are infinitely lived, owned by households. Construction firms, like in
Gertler and Karadi (2011), finance their capital purchase by issuing a perfectly state-contingent securities
to bankers, so their profits are zero in every period.
The government is independent from the central bank in our model. Each period, the government
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collects tax from households to pay for the coupon for the outstanding government bonds (perpetuities).
The government is assumed to not issue new government bonds in our model.
The central bank uses the payoffs they get from holding the government bonds (or other assets) to pay
for the interest paid on reserves to bankers. The remaining payoffs are transferred back to the government
to transfer to households. The central bank also purchases or sells the government bonds to bankers every
period to adjust the level of reserves and the federal funds rate. In the unconventional monetary policy, the
central bank might purchase the financial claims on the construction firms from bankers.
2.3 Goods and Production Technology
There are four types of goods in the economy: final consumption good yt produced by retailers, wholesale
goods yt( j) produced by wholesale firm j, intermediate good ymt produced by households, and housing ht
produced by construction firms. Besides that, there are two types of capital in the economy: Kt and Ht .
Each period households self-employ their labor l˜t and use the capital Kt−1 to produce the homogeneous
intermediate good ymt under the Cobb-Douglas production function:
ymt = K
α
t−1l˜
1−α
t
where α is the share of capital in the production function. Capital K depreciates with the rate δ . Households
also own a technology to convert one unit of final good yt to one unit of capital type K and vice versa. So
each period they also make an investment It . Households sell ymt to wholesale firms.
There is a continuum of wholesale firms indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. Each wholesale firm purchases the
homogeneous intermediate good ymt from households and differentiates it into a distinctive wholesale goods
yt( j) under the following technology:
yt( j) = ymt
Then retail firms produce the final good yt by aggregating a variety of differentiated wholesale goods
yt( j):
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt( j)
θ−1
θ d j
) θ
θ−1
Construction firms use the capital Ht−1 they purchase from other construction firms at the end of the
period t−1 to build new housing. Let iht be the amount of new housing which is built in the period t. The
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production function of a construction firm is:
iht = Ht−1
We assume that capital H is not depreciated and there is a total fixed amount H of this capital in the
economy. In equilibrium, Ht = H. The stock of housing in the economy is ht . Housing is depreciated with
the rate δ h, so:
ht = (1−δ h)ht−1+ iht
2.4 Asset Technology
There are four types of financial assets: government bonds bgt , bank loans bht , financial claims on the con-
struction firms xt , and interbank loans b
f
t . Let Pt be the price of the final good yt , some of our financial
instruments are indexed to the price level Pt .
(a) Government bonds (bgt ): are issued by the government. They are traded between bankers and the
central bank. We assume that households do not hold government bonds. We model government bonds
bgt as consols, which are indexed to the price level Pt . The owner of 1 unit of government bonds at time
t will receive Pj units of dollars for every period j where j≥ t+1. The price of one unit of government
bond is qt . The total number of government bonds issued by the government is fixed.
(b) Bank loans to households (bht ) : We follow Leland and Toft (1996) and Bianchi and Bigio (2014) to
model the loan structure between bankers and households. We assume that the loan contract between
bankers and households is in a particular form that each period households only need to pay a fraction
δb of the total real debt stock in the previous period bht−1. Let b
h
t be the real loan stock in the period t,
let st be the real flow of new loan issuance, we have:
bht = (1−δb)bht−1+ st
In detail, the real flow new loans issuance st constitutes a promise from households to pay for the
bankers the nominal amount st(1−δb)nδbPt+1+n in period t +n+1, for all n≥ 0. So banks’ loans are
also indexed to the price level. The price of loan rt is determined by a perfectly competitive market.
When issuing loans st , bank will open an account for households and only deposit rtst into their account.
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So if rt < 1, bankers earn an immediate accounting profit (1− rt)st . Loans are illiquid and bankers
cannot sell loans.
(c) Financial claim on the construction firms (xt) : are issued by the construction firms. We assume that
only bankers can purchase these claims as they have technology to verify the revenue of the construction
firms. It is also assumed that these claims can be traded between bankers. Each financial claim has a
price vt and pays a stochastic real payoff rxt .
(d) Interbank loan (b ft ): Bankers can borrow reserves from other bankers in the federal funds market.
The nominal gross interest rate in the federal funds market is the federal funds rate R ft .
2.5 Money
There are two types of electronic money in our economy: reserves nt and zero maturity deposits mt .
(a) Reserves (nt): is a type of e-money issued by the central bank. Only government and bankers have an
account at the central bank, so only government and bankers have reserves3. Each period, the central
bank pays a gross interest rate Rn on these reserves4. Reserves are used for settling the transactions
between bankers and bankers, bankers and central bank, bankers and government.
(b) Zero maturity deposits (mt): is a type of e-money issued by the bankers. Each period, banks pay the
interest rate Rmt for these ZMDs which is determined by the perfectly competitive market. Money mt is
used for settling the transaction in the private sector. These ZMDs are insured by the central bank, so
they are totally safe. ZMDs and reserves have the same unit of account.
In the electronic payment system, there is a connection between the flows of reserves and deposits. For
example, we assume that wholesale firm A (whose account at bank A) pays 1 dollar for household B
(whose account at bank B). Then the flow of payment will follow Table (1). For a transaction between
government and households, or between the central bank and households, money still flows through banks,
so we can think this contains two sub-transactions. One is between government and banks, which is settled
by reserves. One is between banks and households, which is settled by ZMDs.
3The amount of US Treasury deposits at the Fed is not considered as reserves in reality. However, for convenience, we also
call that money as reserves in our model. In equilibrium, the balance of the government account at the central bank is zero, so it
does not matter.
4Throughout our paper, it is assumed that Rn is a constant. Only in the section 6.8, we consider Rnt is a time-varying variable
decided by the central bank.
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Wholesale firm A Household B
Deposit: -1 Payable:-1 Deposit: +1
Receivable:-1
Bank A Bank B
Reserve: -1 Deposit: -1 Reserve: +1 Deposit: +1
The Fed
Reserve (bank A): -1
Reserve (bank B):+1
Table 1: Electronic Payment System
2.6 Regulations
There are two central bank’s regulations that bankers have to face each period: reserves requirement and
capital requirement
(a) Reserves Requirement: At the end of each period, bankers have to hold enough reserves that is greater
or equal to a fraction ϕ of total deposits.
(b) Capital Requirement: At the end of each period, bankers’ net worth must be greater or equal to a
fraction κ of the sum of their loan issuance and the total value of financial claims on the construction
firms.
2.7 Timing within one period
1. The housing demand shock ξt realizes.
2. Production take places. Households produce the homogeneous intermediate goods ymt and sell them to
wholesale producers . Wholesale producers differentiate them and sell to retailers. Retailers then pro-
duce the final consumption good. The construction firms also build new houses. All of the payments
of these transaction are delayed until the step 5.
3. Bankers pays the interest rate for ZMDs that households deposit at time t − 1. The loan market
between bankers and households open.
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4. The final good market and housing market open. Households need ZMDs in advance to purchase both
housing and final goods.
5. ZMD payments are settled: The retailers pay the wholesale firms. The wholesale firms pay house-
holds. The profits of wholesale firms are also distributed to households. Tax/Transfer is sent from the
government to households. Payoffs from the financial claims on the construction firms go to bankers.
6. The banking market opens. Banker can adjust the level of reserves by borrowing in the interbank
market, receiving new deposits, trading xt or b
g
t with other bankers and central bank. The central
bank also pays the interest rate on reserves for bankers.
3 Agents’ Problems
3.1 Bankers
There is a measure one of identical bankers in the economy. These bankers have to maintain a good balance
sheet under the regulation of the central bank. There are five types of assets on the bankers’ balance sheet:
reserves (nt), government bonds (b
g
t ), loans to households (bht ), loan to other bankers (b
f
t ) and financial
claims on the construction firms (xt). The bankers’ liability side contains the zero-maturity deposits that
households deposit here (mt).
Banker
Reserves: nt Zero Maturity Deposits:
mt
Rmt
Govt bonds: bgt ×qt Net worth
Loans to households: bht
Claims on construction firms: xt× vt
Loans to other bankers:
b ft
R ft
Cost: We assume that banks face two kinds of cost when issuing loan. First, it is the operating cost when
bankers have to manage to collect the payment from households on time. The operating cost, measured by
the unit of final goods, is proportional to the loan size νbht , where ν is a parameter.
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The second cost is an asymmetric adjustment cost when bankers change the size of loan stock:
f
(
st
bht−1
)
=
υ
4
max
{
st
bht−1
−δb,0
}4
When households want to reduces their debt stock by borrowing less, banker incurs no cost. However, when
bankers want to increase the loan stock, they have to pay the marketing expense. These costs are in terms
of final goods. The parameter υ governs the size of this cost.
On the timing of the market, it is worth noting that bankers can adjust the level of their deposits and
reserves after households and firms pay for each other. When a wholesale firm, who has an account a bank
B, pays for a household, who has an account at bank A, the deposits and reserves of bank B will reduce by
the same amount, while the deposits and reserves of bank A will increase by the same amount. When the
different parties in the economy pay each other, a banker can witness the deposits and reserves outflow from
or inflow to his bank. Let NIFt be the net inflow of deposits and reserves go into their bank, bankers will
take NIFt as given. When the banking market opens, as the deposit market is perfectly competitive, banker
can choose any amount dˆt of deposit inflows or outflows to his bank. Hence, if we let dt = NIFt + dˆt , the
variable dt will be a choice variable in bankers’ problem.
In each period, bankers treat all the prices as exogenously and choose { ct ,nt ,bht ,st ,mt ,b
f
t ,xt ,dt ,b
g
t } to
maximize their expected utility over a stream of consumptions:
maxEt
[
∞
∑
i=0
β i log(ct+i)
]
subject to
Rnnt−1
pit
+bgt−1+
b ft−1
pit
+dt−Tt = nt +qt(bgt −bgt−1)+ vt(xt− xt−1)+
b ft
R ft
(Reserve Flows) (1)
mt
Rmt
=
mt−1
pit
+ f
(
st
bht−1
)
+νbht + rtst−δbbht−1+ ct− xt−1rxt +dt−Tt (Deposit Flows) (2)
bht = (1−δb)bht−1+ st (Loan Stocks) (3)
nt ≥ ϕ mtRmt
(Reserves Requirement) (4)
nt +b
g
t qt +
b ft
R ft
+bht + xtvt−
mt
Rmt
≥ κ
(
bht + xtvt
)
(Capital Requirement) (5)
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Banker Banker
Reserves: +dt Deposits: +dt Reserves: - (b
g
t −bgt−1)qt
Bonds: + (bgt −bgt−1)qt
Table 2: Bankers choose more deposits (left) and purchase bonds (right)
The Fed Banker Households
Bank Reserves: -T Reserves: -T Deposits: -T Deposits: -T Tax Due: -T
Treasury Deposit: +T
Table 3: Government collects tax from households
Banker Banker
Loans: +st Deposits: +rtst Loans: -δbbht−1 Deposits: -δbb
h
t−1
Net worth: + (1− rt)st
Table 4: Banker issues loans (left) and collects loans (right)
Banker Banker
Deposits: +ct Deposits: +( f (.)+νbht )
Net worth: - ct Net worth: - ( f (.)+νbht )
Table 5: Banker consumes (left) and pays for cost (right)
The equation (1) shows the evolution of reserves in the banker’s balance sheet. After receiving the
interest rate paid on reserves, the previous reserves balance becomes Rnnt−1/pit . He also receives the payoffs
from holding government bonds bgt−1; and collects the payment from the loan he lends out to other bankers
in the previous period b ft−1/pit . He can also increase his reserves by taking more deposits dt . When the
banker receives more deposit inflows, his reserves and his liability increase by the same amount (Table 2).
That is the reason we see dt appear on both the equation (1) and (2). The similar effect can be found on
Tt- the net tax that the government imposes on households. In this case, bankers debit the households’
deposit accounts then transfer reserves from their accounts to the account of the government at the central
bank (Table 3). Banker can then leave reserves nt at the central bank’s account to earn the interest rate, or
purchase the government bonds qt(b
g
t −bgt−1), or purchase the financial claims vt(xt−xt−1), or lend reserves
to another bankers b ft /R
f
t .
The equation (2) shows the evolution of deposits on the liability side. Bankers make loans by issuing
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deposits (Table 4). So when they make a loan (rtst), the balance sheet expands. When they collect the
payoffs from the loan (δbbht−1), the balance sheet shrinks. The banker also issues their own deposits to
purchase the consumption good from firms (ct) and to pay the cost (in terms of final goods) related to lending
activities ( f (st/bht )+νbht ) (Table 4). The total amount of deposits also decline when the construction firms
pay for the bankers (xt−1rxt ).
Bankers face two constraints in every period. At the end of each period, banks have to hold enough
reserves as a fraction of total deposits (4). This constraint should be interpreted more broadly than the the
real life reserves requirement in US because the total ZMDs here include not only the checkable deposits
but also the saving account and money market deposit account.
The second constraint plays the key role in our model - the capital requirement constraint. The left
hand side of (5) is the banker’s net worth (capital), which is equal to total assets minus total liabilities. The
constraint requires bank to hold capital greater than a fraction of total loans they issue, where financial claim
is also considered as a type of commercial loans.
Let λt , µt be the Lagrangian multipliers attached to the reserves constraint and the capital constraint.
Let Rxt be gross nominal return on the financial claim xt , which is defined as:
Rxt+1 =
(vt+1+ rxt+1)pit+1
vt
The first order conditions of the banker’s problem can be written as:
1
ct
= βR ft Et
[
1
ct+1pit+1
]
+µt (6)
1
ct
= βRmt Et
[
1
ct+1pit+1
]
+µt +ϕλt (7)
1
ct
= βEt
[
Rxt+1
ct+1pit+1
]
+(1−κ)µt (8)
1
ct
= βRnEt
[
1
ct+1pit+1
]
+λt +µt (9)
1
ct
= βEt
[
1+qt+1
qtct+1
]
+µt (10)
In all cases, we have max{Rn,Rmt } ≤ R ft . The natural lower bound for the federal funds rate R ft will be
the interest rate paid on reserves Rn. Holding reserves brings two benefits to the bankers: (i) it earns the
interest rate Rn; (ii) it helps bank to satisfy the reserve requirement, showed in λt . The opportunity cost of
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holding reserves is the federal funds rate that bankers can earn when lending out reserves to other bankers.
From the equation (6) and (9), when the reserves requirement is no longer bound, R ft = Rn.
We denote f ′t = f ′(st/bht−1) and f
′
t+1 = f
′(st+1/bht ). The first order condition for choosing the loan stock
can be written as:
1
ct
(
ν+ rt +
f ′t
bht−1
)
= Et
[
βδb
ct+1
]
+Et
[
β st+1 f ′t+1
ct+1(bht )2
]
+Et
[
β (1−δb)(rt+1bht + f ′t+1)
ct+1bht
]
+(1−κ)µt (11)
The price of loans that households borrow from bankers rt depends on µt- the shadow price of the capital
constraint, ν- the monitoring cost and the adjustment cost. When the capital constraint is binding, rt is lower
than before, implying that the real cost of borrowing for households increase.
3.2 Households/Intermediate Good Producers
There is a measure one of identical households. These self-employed households produce the homogeneous
intermediate good ym to sell to the wholesale firms at Pmt , or the real relative price p
m
t . In each period, house-
hold purchases the final consumption good (c˜t) from the retail firms and housing (h˜t) from the construction
firms. They also have a technology to convert one unit of consumption goods to one unit of capital type
K and vice versa . We assume the discount factor of the households is smaller than the discount factor of
the bankers, β˜ (1+ ν) < β , therefore, households will borrow from the bankers. Let b˜ht be the debt stock
that households borrow from bankers. Recalling from the section 2.4, each period households only pay a
fraction δb of the old debts. We impose an exogenous borrowing constraint for households with the debt
limit bh.
Households face the “ZMD-in-advance” when the good market opens. Let at be the amount of total
ZMDs that they hold when entering the goods market and housing market. Their total purchase of final
goods and new housing has to be less than or equal to at .
In each period, households choose {c˜t , m˜t ,at , h˜t , l˜t , b˜ht , s˜t , It ,Kt , i˜ht } to maximize their expected utility:
maxEt
[
∞
∑
i=0
β˜ i
(
log(c˜t+i)+ξt log(h˜t+i)−χ
l˜1+ηt+i
1+η
)]
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subject to
at +δbb˜ht−1 =
m˜t−1
pit
+ rt s˜t (Loans Market Open) (12)
c˜t + It +qht i˜
h
t ≤ at (ZMDs-in-advance) (13)
m˜t
Rmt
+ c˜t +δbb˜ht−1+q
h
t i˜
h
t + It +Tt =
m˜t−1
pit
+ rt s˜t + pmt y
m
t +
Πt
Pt
(Budget Constraint) (14)
i˜ht = h˜t− (1−δ h)h˜t−1 (Residential Investment) (15)
It = Kt− (1−δ )Kt−1 (Investment) (16)
b˜ht = (1−δb)b˜ht−1+ s˜t (Loan Stock) (17)
ymt = K
α
t−1 l˜
1−α
t (Production Function) (18)
b˜ht ≤ bh (Borrowing Constraint) (19)
The equation (12) shows the constraint households face when the loan market opens but the final good
market has not opened yet. Households bring m˜t/pit amount of money from the previous period, obtaining
new loan rt s˜t , paying back a fraction of the previous loan δbb˜ht−1, and bring at amount of money into the
final good market.
The constraint (13) is the “cash-in-advance” constraint in Lucas and Stokey (1987). The only difference
here is that currency does not exist in our model, so “cash” should be interpreted as ZMDs. Households
need ZMDs in advance to purchase the consumption goods, housing and making investment. Wang and
Wen (2006) shows that putting investment in the cash-in-advance constraint can generate the persistence of
output and inflation in the data.
The equation (14) shows the typical budget constraint households face in each period. After paying
the debts (δbb˜ht−1) in the previous period to the banker, and obtaining new loans (rt s˜t), in addition to their
previous balance in the deposit account (m˜t−1/pit), households will receive income from selling intermedi-
ate goods (pmt y
m
t ) and the profits from the wholesale firms (Πt). They spend on consumption goods (c˜t),
investment It , new housing i˜ht , leave some money as the zero-maturity deposits at the banks m˜t/R
m
t , and pay
(receive) the tax (transfer) Tt to the government.
The equation (18) shows the production function of households. In each period, households combine
their own labor and capital in the Cobb-Douglas form to produce the intermediate goods. Here we assume
the household self-employs their workers, but the analysis will not change if households supply labor and
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hire labor in the competitive market.
We assume that households face an exogenous borrowing constraint, rather than a collateral borrowing
constraint like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). Our purpose is to emphasize that the
mechanism of the shock transmission in our model is not related to the collateral constraint literature.
We model housing as a durable good. Housing is depreciated at the rate δ h. There is a housing demand
shock in our model, captured by the time-varying parameter ξt . We assume the motion of ξt follows the
equation:
log(ξt) = (1−ρ) log(ξ )+ρ log(ξt−1)+ εt , εt ∼ N(0,σ2) (20)
Let γt ,Λt ,ωt be respectively as the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint (13), (14) and (19). We have:
1
c˜t
− γt−Λt = 0 (21)
Λt = β˜Rmt Et
[
1
c˜t+1pit+1
]
(22)
qht
c˜t
=
ξt
h˜t
+ β˜ (1−δ h)Et
[
qht+1
c˜t+1
]
(23)
χ l˜η+1t = (1−α)Λt pmt ymt (24)
rt
c˜t
= β˜ δbEt
[
1
c˜t+1
]
+ β˜ (1−δb)Et
[
rt+1
c˜t+1
]
+ωt (25)
1
c˜t
= β˜ (1−δ )Et
[
1
c˜t+1
]
+ β˜Et
[
αΛt+1 pmt+1y
m
t+1
Kt
]
(26)
From the equations (21) and (22), we can rewrite:
1
c˜t
= β˜Rmt Et
[
1
c˜t+1pit+1
]
+ γt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Liquidity Premium
As money plays the role of medium of exchange in our model, it’s value contains the liquidity part. In
the steady state, the rate of return on money has to be less than 1/β˜ - the risk-free rate that households lend
out to each other (if possible). This equation plays the important role when we analyze the implication when
the central bank keeps the interest rate at the lower bound Rn for a long time.
The equation (25) gives us the marginal cost and the marginal benefit when households borrow one
more unit of loans from bankers. As the loan market opens before the goods market, one more unit of loan
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can relax both cash-in-advance constraint and the general budget constraint, allowing the households to
consume more. The left hand side of (25) is the marginal benefit when household borrow one more unit of
st with the price rt . The marginal cost is more challenging to understand as the maturity of loan is not finite.
When households borrow one more unit of st , in the next period, they have to pay β˜ δbst , so it explains the
first part on the right hand side of the equation (25). The second part is the present value of the remaining
debts carrying on to the following period after households borrow one more unit of st . The final component
is the shadow price ωt of the borrowing constraint. In our model, the borrowing constraint will be bound at
the steady state. However, the interesting part of our paper happens when bankers actively cut the level of
loans and the constraint (19) is no longer binding, ωt=0.
Similarly, the marginal cost and the marginal benefit when household invest one more unit of capital
are showed in the equation (26). When households decide to transform 1 unit of consumption good to 1
unit of capital, the marginal cost (left hand side) is the marginal utility lost from not consuming this 1 unit.
However, if investing into capital, households receive two benefits in the next period. The first thing is
capital, after depreciation, can transform back to the consumption good for consuming in the future. The
second thing is the increase in the level of output in the next period from investing 1 more unit of capital in
this period.
3.3 Construction Firms
Competitive construction firms build houses that are eventually sold to households. At the end of the period
t, a construction firm acquires the capital Ht for use in the production in the subsequent period. It is noted
that the capital type H is totally different from the capital type K, and they are not substitutable. We assume
capital H is the only factor in the production function of construction firms. After production in the period
t + 1, capital is not depreciated and the firm can sell the capital in the open market to other construction
firms. There are no adjustment costs at the firm level, so the firm’s capital choice problem is always static.
The construction firms finance their capital acquisition in each period by obtaining funds from bankers.
Follow Gertler and Karadi (2011), to acquire the funds to purchase capital at the end of t, the firm issues xt
claims equal to the number of units of capital they acquire Ht . Under the no arbitrage condition, the price
of each claim vt will be equal to the price of a unit of capital type H.
It is assumed that the bankers has perfect information about the firm and has no problem enforcing
payoffs. The firms is thus able to offer the banker a perfectly state-contingent securities. At the end, the
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construction firms will always get zero profits, while the bankers might earn positive or negative profits
depended on the realization of the housing demand shock.
The production function of the construction firms is:
iht = Ht−1 (27)
Let qht be the price of houses in the period t. Given that the construction firm earns the zero profit state-by-
state, rxt - the real payoffs (excluding the capital gain) paid to the owner of one financial claim-and R
x
t - the
gross nominal return for holding this claim- will be:
rxt = q
h
t (28)
Rxt =
(qht xt + vtxt)pit
vt−1xt−1
(29)
3.4 Retail Firms
Retail firms competitively produce the final consumption goods. The retail firm buy and aggregate a variety
of differentiated wholesale goods indexed by j ∈ [0,1] using a CES technology:
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt( j)
θ−1
θ d j
) θ
θ−1
where θ is the elasticity of substitution among the wholesale goods. Profit maximization and the zero profit
condition give the demand for the wholesale good j
yt( j) =
(
Pt( j)
Pt
)−θ
yt (30)
3.5 Wholesale Firms
There is a unit mass of wholesale firms on [0,1] that are monopolistic competitors. Wholesale firms buy the
intermediate good ymt at P
m
t from the households in a competitive market, differentiate the good at no cost
into yt( j) and sell it with the price Pt( j) to the retailer.
yt( j) = ymt (31)
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Follow Rotemberg pricing, we assume that each wholesale goods firm j faces costs of adjusting prices,
which are measured in terms of final good and given by:
ι
2
(
Pt( j)
Pt−1( j)
−1
)2
yt
where ι is the adjustment cost parameter which determines the degree of nominal price rigidity. The whole-
sale firm j discounts the profit in the future with rate β˜ iΛt+i/Λt , where Λt is the shadow price attached to
the households’ budget constraint. The problem of firm j is given by:
max
{Pt( j)}
Et
∞
∑
i=0
{
β˜ i
Λt+i
Λt
[(
Pt+i( j)
Pt+i
− pmt+i
)
yt+i( j)− ι2
(
Pt( j)
Pt−1( j)
−1
)2
yt+ j
]}
subject to its demand in equation (30).
In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms will choose the same price and produce the same quantity Pt( j)=Pt
and yt( j) = yt = ymt . The optimal pricing rule then implies that:
1− ι (pit−1)+ ιβ˜Et
[
Λt+1
Λt
(pit+1−1)pit+1 yt+1yt
]
= (1− pmt )θ (32)
3.6 The Central Bank
The central bank conducts open market operation, by purchasing and selling government bonds with bankers
every period, to target the the interest rate R ft that bankers borrow from each other. By purchasing the
government bonds held by bankers, it increases the level of reserves, relaxing the reserves requirement
constraint, and therefore lowering the federal funds rate and the prime rate.
When we model explicitly the process of how the central bank controls the federal funds rate, the
“traditional” Taylor rule is not enough for the determinacy. There are infinite levels of reserves that satisfy
R ft = Rn. Hence, when the federal funds rate is at its lower bound, we need a rule governing the motion of
the level of reserves (reserves targeting) (Figure 1).
We assume that the central bank follows the hybrid rule which is resulted from the combination of federal
funds rate targeting and reserves targeting:
R ft = R f +φn
(
nt− (1−ρn)n−ρnnt−1
n
)
+φpi(pit−pi)+φy(log(yt)− log(y)) (33)
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Figure 1: The Federal Funds Market
where ρn is the persistence of the level of reserves; φn, φpi and φy is the coefficient responding to the reserve
gap, inflation gap and output gap; R f , n, pi and y are the federal funds rate, reserves, inflation and final good
outputs at the deterministic steady state.
Like the Taylor rule in the New Keynesian literature, the interbank rate responds to the output gap
and the inflation rate. However, this rule departs from the traditional Taylor rule in two important points.
First, it also includes the gap between the current level of reserves and its steady state value. The return
of the federal funds rate to the steady state value is not enough to guarantee that the level of reserves and
government bonds held by bankers also back to the steady state. Therefore, the federal funds rate should
respond to the reserves gap. Does the appearance of reserves gap change significantly the Taylor rule?
The answer is no, φn is positive but very small so it nearly does not have any effects when the reserves
requirement is still binding.
Second, unlike the conventional Taylor rule, we do not see the zero lower bound here. This is one of the
most interesting points in our model. The natural lower bound for the federal funds rate in our model is the
interest rate paid on reserves. When the central bank injects the amount of reserves over the critical point
where the reserves requirement is no longer binding, R ft will be automatically equal to Rn from (6) and (9).
So what does the equation (33) mean in this case ? When R ft = Rn, it implies the central bank will switch
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from targeting the federal funds rate to targeting the level of reserves to responds to the output gap and the
inflation rate. It also implies that when the banking system is awash of reserves, the central bank can still
control the federal funds rate by changing its policy on interest rate paid on reserves. We will discuss this
policy later in the paper. For now, we assume Rn is constant and the central bank will only follow the rule
in (33).
3.7 The Government
We assume the government is totally independent from the central bank. It does not change its fiscal policy
in our model. The total outstanding government bonds is fixed. Each period, the government collects tax
from households to pay coupons for the government bond holders, which are central bank and bankers.
When the central bank receives the payoffs from government bonds, they use them to pay the interest
rate paid on reserves for bankers (Rn− 1)nt−1/pi . We assume that central bank holds a big number of
government bonds such that the payoffs are greater than (Rn− 1)nt−1/pi . After that, for the remaining
payoffs, the central bank will transfer them back to the government, who in turn will transfer it back to
households. So let Tt be the net tax households (in real term) have to pay:
Tt = b
g
t−1+
(Rn−1)nt−1
pit
(34)
It is worth noting that, as government bonds are indexed, we do not have to keep track the balance sheet of
the Fed explicitly. It is no longer true if we assume the central bank holds nominal long term government
bond.
4 Equilibrium
Definition: A competitive equilibrium is a stochastic sequence of bankers’ decision choice {ct ,nt ,bht ,st ,mt ,
b ft ,xt ,dt ,b
g
t }, household’s choice {c˜t , b˜ht , s˜t , m˜t , l˜t ,Kt , It , y˜mt }, wholesale firm’s choice {ymt }, retail firm’s
choice {yt}, the government tax {Tt}, and the market price {rt ,R ft ,qt ,pit , pmt } such that given the market
price, banker’s choices solve the banker’s problem, household’s choices solve the household’s problem,
wholesale firm’s choice solves the equation (32), the government’s budget is balance, the stochastic se-
quence {R ft ,nt} satisfy the central bank rule and all the markets clear.
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The market clearing condition implies that:
Net flows of reserves between bankers: dt = 0 (35)
The interbank market: b ft = 0 (36)
Total ZMDs: mt = m˜t (37)
Loan Market: bht = b˜
h
t (38)
Capital H and Financial claim: xt = Ht = H (39)
Housing Market: i˜ht = iht = H (40)
Consumption Good Market: yt = ct + c˜t + It +νbht + f
(
st
bht−1
)
+
ι
2
(pit−1)2yt (41)
It is worth noting that, as the reserves only flow from one bank to another bank, the total net flows of
reserves in equilibrium will be zero. If we only consider the symmetric competitive equilibrium where all
banks are identical, then dt must be zero. This condition, (34), (36) and (39) imply that the evolution of
reserves (1) in the banking system, in equilibrium, can be written as:
nt−1
pi
= nt +qt(b
g
t −bgt−1)
In the conventional monetary policy, we assume that the central bank only purchase the government
bonds. Under that condition, the level of reserves in the banking system will increase when the central bank
conducts the open market purchase and reduce when they conducts the open market sales. It is emphasized
here that the level of reserves in the banking system is decided solely by the central bank. Each individual
commercial bank can change its own level of reserves, but the sum amount of reserves are not decided by
commercial banks. Under the normal condition, by manipulating the level of reserves, the central bank can
adjust the federal funds rate and the level of money supply.
The right hand side of the equation (41) shows the aggregate demand of the economy. We can decom-
pose it into four components: (i) the aggregate consumption as the sum of bankers’ consumption (ct) and
households’ consumption (c˜t), (ii) the private investment (It), (iii) the cost of providing services in the bank-
ing sector νbht + f (.) and (iv) the inflation cost. When the housing demand shock ξt is realized, later we
will see that the decline in It is the biggest factor for the collapse of the aggregate demand.
The system of equilibrium conditions (C.1)-(C.28) is written in a compact form in the Appendix.
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5 The Deterministic Steady State
To ensure that in the steady state, households will borrow from banker and the borrowing constraint is
binding, we assume that the discount rate of households is smaller than the one of bankers after adjusting
for the cost of loan.
Assumption 1:
β˜ (ν+1)< β
Assumption 2:
The long-run interbank rate that the central bank target is 1/β .
R f = 1/β > Rn
Theorem 1: Under the Assumption (1) and (2), the deterministic steady state where R f = 1/β will lie in
the region where the capital constraint is slack (µ = 0) and the reserves constraint is binding (λ > 0).
From the Assumption 2 and (6), if µ > 0 then R f < 1/β , lower than the central bank long run target. If
λ = 0, then R f = Rn, which is contradict with the Assumption 2. We want to restrict ourself to the steady
state similar to the banking state before the Great Recession to illustrate the effect of housing crisis on the
economy.
6 Quantitative Analysis
6.1 Calibration
We calibrate the banker’s discount factor β = 0.99, implying the federal funds rate at the steady state is
around 4.04 percent annually, which is roughly matched with the average of the effective federal funds
rate before the Great Recession. The reserves requirement ϕ and n are set to match the ratio between the
amount of zero maturity deposits and the level of reserves in the banking system. ZMDs are calculated as
the difference between the total MZM (money zero maturity) and the currency. We average the ratio data
between ZMDs and reserves during the 2008Q1, which is around 527 times, or ϕ = 0.199. For the capital
requirement, we calibrate κ = 0.2 so the banker’s net worth is 1 percent higher than the constraint. The
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parameter ν is set to make the bank’s loan rate to household is around 0.5 percent higher than the federal
funds rate in the steady state. The fraction of paid loan δb is set to 0.2, which is 20 percent of the total
loan stock. It is important to remark here that our banker’s balance sheet does not contain the time deposit
(both small-denomination and large denomination), which accounts for approximately 25 percent of total
bankers’ asset.
For the households, the parameters { β˜ , χ , η , δ , α } are calibrated in the standard way. The two
nonstandard parameters are ξ , the relative utility weight of housing, and bh, the exogenous borrowing
constraints. We calibrate ξ so the total value of financial claims on the construction firms accounts for 35
percent of total banker’s asset. We should interpret that these financial claims also account partial to the level
of mortgage loans in the commercial bank’s balance sheet. So more than one third of commercial banks’
balance sheet in our model is exposed to the housing demand shock. The other nonstandard parameter is
bh, which is set so the total household debt is around 100 percent of household’s consumption.
On the supply side, we calibrate the elasticity of substitution between wholesale goods is 4, which is in
range from 3 to 5, that is common in the literature. The cost of changing price in the Rotemberg model is
set to 50.
About the central bank’s rule, the reaction of the federal funds rate to the output gap is set to 0.25/4, to
the inflation gap is set to 1.5. A new parameter appears in our model is ρn, the persistence in the level of
reserves. We set it at the level of 0.8, means that once the Fed injects a lot of reserves in the banking system,
the central bank will not drain it quickly in the following period. We can say that the flow of reserves is
smooth.
6.2 Solution Method
We focus on the recursive competitive equilibrium when the prices and decision rules are the functions of
state variables. Our problem has 6 state variables {bgt−1,nt−1,mt−1,bht−1,Kt−1,ξt} when we assume the cen-
tral bank follows the conventional monetary policy by purchasing only government bonds. The problem has
3 occasionally binding constraints, which are the reserves requirement constraint, the capital constraint and
the borrowing constraint. These constraints require us to use a global solution to solve the model. Moreover,
some variables, like reserves and the amount of government bonds held by bankers, can jump to points very
far from the steady state. Reserves can be five times as high as the level at the steady state. As the result
of that, the solution is very nonlinear and non-smooth in nature. We use the nonlinear certainty equivalent
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Table 6: Parameter values
Param. Definition Value
Bankers
β Banker’s discount factor 0.99
ϕ The reserves requirement 0.0019
κ The risk weight 0.199
ν The monitoring cost 0.0005
δb The fraction of loan is paid 0.2
υ The adjustment cost for loan portfolio 1000
Households
β˜ Household’s discount factor 0.985
ξ Relative Utility Weight of Housing 0.0075
χ Relative Utility Weight of Labor 0.92
η Inverse Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply 0.35
bh The borrowing limit 1.485
δ h House’s depreciation rate 0.025
δ Capital’s depreciation rate 0.025
α Capital share in production function 0.34
Firms
θ Elasticity of substitution of wholesale goods 4
ι Cost of changing price 50
H The total capital H 0.04
Central bank
n Reserves at steady state 0.0035
φn Policy respond to reserves gap 0.0035
ρn The persistence of reserves 0.8
φpi Policy respond to inflation 1.5
φy Policy respond to output gap 0.25/4
Shock Process
ρ Persistence of shock 0.99
σ The standard deviation of shock 0.047
approximation method in Cai, Judd and Steinbuks (2015) to solve our model. This method contains three
main steps: (i) build a grid and transform a stochastic problem into a deterministic problem, (ii) solve the
deterministic problem in each grid point to find the next period decision’s rule, (iii) finally approximate the
decision rule in whole grid from the results in step 2. The method is global and deals well with the inequality
constraint. However, we will lose some accuracy from ignoring the uncertainty when agents make decision.
In this paper, we use the software Ipopt (Interior Point Method) written by Wachter and Biegler (2006) to
solve the large system of equation in each grid point.
Follow Brumm and Scheidegger (2015), we build a Clenshaw-Curtis sparse grid (level 4), then add
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points to refine the grid adaptively. The description of how to build this grid is presented in the Appendix
(B). Smolyak grid can deal with the “curse of dimensionality” problem in macroeconomics. It detail de-
scription and applications in economics can be found in Malin, Krueger and Kubler (2011), Judd et al.
(2014), Brumm and Scheidegger (2015). In our problem, when building grid, we also use the adaptive
domain technique in Judd et al. (2014) for the two pairs of state variables bg -n, and bh-m. When the central
bank conducts the open market purchase, the increase of reserves nt is associated with the decrease the
government bond held by banker. It is likely that we are never in a state that both reserves and government
bonds held by banker are at the high level, so for these two states, we put them in a parallelogram rather
than a rectangular. The same principle is applied for bh and m as they tend to move together in the same
direction. Judd et al. (2014) use the stochastic simulation from the solution of linear model to identify the
adaptive domain region while we only use the ad-hoc way to identify the adaptive domain.
For each grid point (each initial state), we solve the deterministic problem, and assume that after T=500,
the economy will be back to the steady state. To deal with the inequality constraints, we use the penalty
method found in McGrattan (1996) to transform the hard constraint into soft constraint. We assume the
utility in one period of bankers has the form:
u(ct ,λ ∗t ,µ
∗
t ) = log(ct)−
1
4
emax{λ ∗t ,0}4−
1
4
emax{µ∗t ,0}4
λ ∗t =
mt
Rmt
− nt
ϕ
µ∗t =
mt
Rmt
−
[
nt +qtb
g
t +(1−κ)(bht + xtvt)
]
where e = 1e8 is the penalty coefficient. It means that any time, bankers violate the reserves requirement
constraint or the capital constraint, they suffer the reduction in their utility. However, if they hold more
reserves or capital than the required amount, they are not rewarded for that. This penalty method is also
applied for the households’ borrowing constraint. Cash-in-advance constraint is always binding in the
deterministic model, so we do not need to transform it.
This setup still ensures that all of our first order conditions are twice differentiable. However, even
with this transformation, our system of equations is still ill-conditioning. Most of the time, we have to use
the homotopy method in combination with nonlinear large scale optimization tool Ipopt to solve the big
deterministic system.
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6.3 Housing Crisis and Conventional Monetary Policy
6.3.1 Shock Transmission in Interbank Market
When a big negative shock on housing demand ξt is realized, price of housing qht drops. Consequently, the
price vt of the financial claims xt on the construction firms and bankers’ net worth must go down. In the
conventional monetary policy, the central bank will conduct the open market purchase to push down the
interbank rate R ft . As the price is sticky, the real rate will go down, pushing up the price of government
bonds and other assets. This can mitigate the initial decline in vt and bring the economy back to the normal
state.
However, when the shock is large and persistent, the conventional monetary policy is not enough for
controlling the decline in vt , especially when the capital constraint is bound. The decline of vt pushes down
the banker’s capital. If bankers’ net worth goes down to the level where the capital constraint is binding,
bankers have to relax this constraint by reducing the loan size bh and the number of financial claims on the
construction firms xt on their balance sheets. This fire sales create the negative externalities as it further
pushes down the vt and bankers’ net worth.
To see the whole process clearly, we start from the equation (28) and impose the equilibrium condition
xt = H:
Rxt =
(qht + vt)pit
vt−1
The above equation decomposes the return on the financial claim into two components: the real payoff qht
and the capital gain when reselling these financial instrument vt . When substituting it into (8), we have:
vt
ct
= βEt
[
qht+1+ vt+1
ct+1
]
+(1−κ)µt (42)
Solving this Euler equation forward and impose the transversality condition, the price vt of the financial
claim xt is:
vt = Et
[
∞
∑
j=1
β j
(
ct
ct+ j
)
qht+ j
]
+(1−κ)Et
[
∞
∑
j=0
β j
(
ct
ct+ j
)
µt+ j
]
(43)
Similarly, we can solve forward for the price qt of government bonds from (10):
qt = Et
[
∞
∑
j=1
β j
(
ct
ct+ j
)]
+Et
[
∞
∑
j=0
β j
(
ct
ct+ j
)
µt+ j
]
(44)
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From (43) and (44), we can express the price vt as the function of government bond’s price, the discounted
housing price from future and the discounted of the shadow price of capital constraint:
vt = qt︸︷︷︸
Govt bonds’ price
+Et
[
∞
∑
j=1
β j
(
ct
ct+ j
)
(qht+ j−1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Adjusted discounted house prices
−κEt
[
∞
∑
j=0
β j
(
ct
ct+ j
)
µt+ j
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shadow price of capital constraint
(45)
The conventional monetary policy can push up the price of government bonds; and therefore, increasing
the price of other assets. However, with a big housing demand shock, the decline of the second term
outweighs the increase in the first term. When the capital constraint starts binding, the contribution of the
increase in the shadow price of capital constraint declines vt further. Even when the central bank pushes R
f
t
to its lower bound (the interest rate paid on reserves Rn), they can not mitigate the decline of vt (Figure 2d).
It is worthy noting that the capital constraint creates the negative externalities when bankers fire-sell
their assets xt , as µt is a function of vt . When bankers make decision about selling xt , they treat the price
vt as given and do not take into account their action on vt . As a result, vt further declines, tightening more
banker’s net worth, pushing up the shadow price µt , which in turn has a feedback effect on vt through (45).
As the supply of xt is fixed at H, bankers have to cut the amount of loans to households bht to satisfy the
capital requirement. This is also the main mechanism that creates the sharp drop in output and investment
in our model.
6.3.2 Deleveraging and Shock Transmission to Production Sector
In a common representative agent framework, the decline in housing demand usually expands the consump-
tion good sector as the agent will switch from spending on housing into on consumption goods. However,
in our model, the sharp decline in the housing price makes the bankers fall into the capital constraint trap,
and the shock is transmitted from the banking sector to the production sector. To relax the capital constraint,
bankers have to actively cut loans to household. The positive of the shadow price µt pushes up the real loan
rate. In a deterministic setting, let rht be defined as:
rht =
δb
rt
+
(1−δb)rt+1
rt
(46)
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Figure 2: The impulse response under −3σ deviation of housing demand shock
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Then we can rewrite the equation (25) in the deterministic setting as:
1
c˜t
= β˜ rht
1
c˜t+1
+ωt
The above equation implies that the real rate rht can be considered roughly as the real prime rate that bankers
lend out to households in the normal one period loan. Figure (2e) shows that the prime rate sharply increases
at the beginning of the crisis even though the central bank already pushes the federal funds rate to the lower
bound Rn. Figure (2c) shows that the amount of loan is cut by 10 percent at the beginning of the crisis.
The deleverage process in the banking sector leads to the situation where the economy lacks liquidity.
The decline of ZMDs tightens the households’ cash-in-advance constraint, forcing them to cut the level of
investment quickly to smooth their consumption. The investment is a key variable causing the sharp decline
and the slow recovery of the aggregate output (Figure 3). The fall in the aggregate demand, in turn, creates
a sharp prolonged deflation episode. Figure (2f) shows that the deflation can last for a long time under the
housing crisis.
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Figure 3: The response of investment I to loan size bh
Our model partially gives the answer to the productivity puzzle in the Great Recession. Even though
outputs in US contracted up to 6.8% in 2008Q4, the data shows that the productivity increased slightly 0.2%
during the Great Recession (Bureau of Labor Statistics Data). It is clear that a big negative productivity
shock cannot explain this phenomenon. In our model, the shock is transmitted to the production sector from
the banking sector. These shocks look like the credit shocks, reducing the private investment sharply. When
the capital stock is destroyed, our model can generate a jump in the labor productivity at the beginning of
the crisis. The interesting part in the shock transmission mechanism in our model. The housing demand
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shock comes from the households, but it mainly affects to the bankers, which in turn, has big feedback effect
on households.
6.3.3 Reserves Skyrockets but Money Supply Declines
Even with the counter-factual experiment that the central bank only conducts the conventional monetary
policy, we can still generate the big jump in the level of reserves, which is nearly four times as high as the
steady state level (Figure 2c). Most of these reserves are certainly excess reserves. By injecting a massive
amount of reserves into the banking system, the reserves constraint is no longer binding λt = 0, the federal
funds rate is at the lower bound R ft = Rn.
One of puzzle in the Great Recession is that the sharp increase in the level of reserves was not accompa-
nied by the increase in the money supply. The insight to understand this phenomenon is pretty clear in our
model. A negative shock to the bankers’ balance sheet forces them to cut down their liability side, which is
the zero maturity deposits. As money in our model is inside money issued by the commercial bank, the total
money supply must decline. Even though the central bank injects a lot of reserves, the main concern now of
the banker is the capital constraint. The money multiplier model predicts that the increase of money supply
is accompanied by the level of reserves based on only the reserves requirement constraint, while ignoring
the more important one - the capital constraint. Hence, it cannot predict what happened during the Great
Recession
The banking crisis is special in the sense that the central bank might lose the control of the money supply
in the short run. That feature in our model is totally different from the New Keynesian literature where the
total money supply is always controlled directly by the central bank. It is nearly impossible to generate the
decline in the money supply in the New Keynesian framework.
6.3.4 Large Shock vs Small Shock
Due to the appearance of three occasionally binding constraints, the economy responds differently to the
small shock and large shock. For the small shocks, the conventional monetary policy is enough to push the
price of xt through lowering the federal funds rate. Bank loans are not cut; therefore, the economy does
not witness the long deflation episode. On the other hand, with the large housing demand shock, the capital
constraint is binding, pushing R ft to the lower bound Rn is not enough to prevent the deleveraging process.
Figure 4 shows the decision rule for inflation as the function of housing demand shock ξ . This graph assume
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that other state variables are in the deterministic steady state level.
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Figure 4: The response of inflation pi to ξ
It is clear that there is a kink in the response of pi to ξ . Once the shock ξ go over the critical level, the
inflation responds more strongly to the decline in ξ . This emphasizes the importance of taking into account
the nonlinearity in the dynamic general equilibrium model.
6.4 Distressed Asset Purchases - Unconventional Monetary Policy
Now we do an experiment that the central bank will purchase the distressed asset xt , rather than the govern-
ment bonds bg from bankers in the crisis. In fact, this experiment is similar to what the Fed did in the QE1
when they purchases the massive amount of agency mortgaged-backed-security from commercial banks.
We still assume that there is a huge negative housing demand shock at time t = 0. In the first experiment,
the central bank immediately responds to the crisis by purchasing xt from time t = 0 (QE since t = 0). In
the second experiment, the central bank still uses the conventional monetary policy at time t = 0 and only
unexpectedly switches to the quantitative easing in period t = 1 (QE since t = 1). In both experiment, the
central bank will purchase the financial claim xt following this rule:
nt = ρnnt−1+(1−ρn)
(
n+(Et
[
Rxt+1
]−Rx))+ εn,t (47)
bgt = bg, ∀t ≥ 1 (48)
εn,0 = αnxv > 0, εn,t = 0 ∀t ≥ 1, QE since t = 0
εn,1 = αnxv > 0, εn,t = 0 ∀t ≥ 2, QE since t = 1
(49)
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We can interpret these above conditions as the following. As bgt is fixed at the steady state level, it means
that the central bank will target the level of reserves by purchasing and selling the financial claims on the
construction firm xt . We can see it more clearly from rewriting the equation (1) under the equilibrium with
bgt = bg:
nt−1
pi
= nt + vt(xt− xt−1)
We also assume that either at time t = 0 or at t = 1, there is unexpected shock εn > 0. It means the
central bank will suddenly purchase αn fraction of the total value of distress assets. We calibrate αn = 0.02,
means that the central bank will purchase around 2 percent of total value (in the steady state) of xt in the
market. After that, there is no other shocks. Central bank will simply slowly sells these asset back to the
market. The parameter ρn is set to equal 0.98, means that the level of reserves is very persistent after the
unconventional monetary policy, or the central bank will keep these assets in their balance sheet for a long
time.
When the central bank purchases a large amount of long term assets, reserves will rise sharply, and of
course, the reserve requirement is no longer binding λ = 0 and the federal funds rate will be equal to the
interest rate paid on reserves R ft = Rn. For this section, we temporarily assume that the central bank does
not use the interest rate paid on reserves Rn to adjust the federal funds rate when the banking system is
awash of reserves. In the next section, we will discuss the situation when the central bank use Rn to adjust
the interbank rate and its influence on the inflation and output path.
For these experiments, we do not calculate the recursive competitive equilibrium as the function of the
state variables like in the conventional monetary policy. We simply calculate the trajectory of the economy
under the perfect foresight condition. It still contains all the interesting switches between the reserves
requirement constraint and the capital constraint. Like in the conventional monetary policy, we assume that
economy is back to the steady state at time T = 1200. As the system is big and very nonlinear, we have to
use the homotopy method in combination with Ipopt to solve this big system.
6.5 Effects on bankers’ balance sheet and asset price
When the central bank suddenly purchases a large amount of the distressed asset, the price vt of the financial
claim on the construction firms goes up immediately. If the amount of purchased asset is large enough, the
central bank can push the banker’s out of the capital constraint quickly. Figure 5 compares the effects when
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the central bank purchases the government bonds in the conventional monetary policy and when it purchases
the distressed assets xt .
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Figure 5: The shadow price of capital constraint
The unconventional monetary policy is very effective to push the bankers out of the capital constraint.
When the housing demand shock is realized, as vt declines, the capital constraint is binding, and the shadow
price µt is positive. With the conventional monetary policy, it takes three quarters for the capital constraint
is slack again while the unconventional policy can help banks out of the capital constraint immediately in
our model. In our experiment 2, the central bank only responds from t = 1 so the capital constraints is still
bound at t = 0.
It is worthy noting that both conventional and unconventional monetary policy help to increase the asset
price in the economy and improve the bankers’ net worth; however, their mechanisms are different. The
conventional monetary policy pushes down the yield of government bonds to affect the yields of xt and its
price vt , whereas the unconventional one directly shifts the demand of xt to the right to push down its yield
and push up its price. Of course, theoretically, there is a risk that the central bank might suffer the loss by
conducting this program. However, through the lens of our model, we know that vt is lower than its “fair
value” due to the fire sales and the binding of the capital constraint. In fact, our model generate that the
central bank gains a lot of profit from conducting this large scale asset purchase program, even though profit
is not the central bank’s target.
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(b) Reserves and Money Multiplier in QE (t=1)
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Figure 6: Compare Quantitative Easing (QE) and Conventional Monetary Policy (CMP)
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6.6 Effect on Output and Inflation in Short-Run
In our experiment, Rn is not adjusted, so when the central bank conducts the quantitative easing, R ft is fixed
at the the lower bound for 65 quarters (more than 15 years) (Figure 6a). In the deterministic setting with
the assumption of constant Rn, the quantitative easing also imply the forward guidance to the public that
the federal funds rate will be at the lower bound Rn for a long time. This has a big effect on the output and
inflation in the short-run as the prime rate rht declines sharply.
Figure (6c) compares the effect of quantitative easing and the conventional monetary policy on outputs
in the short run. By putting the federal funds rate and the prime rate to the low level, quantitative easing
can quickly push up the output level to the steady state level. The credit flow is recovered more quickly as
the commercial bank is no longer in the capital constraint. If the central bank conducts quantitative easing
since t = 0, the crisis will not even happen in our model. The interesting part of our model is the housing
demand shock itself only affects the asset price, and crisis is transmitted through the financial market and
bank lending channel. By purchasing xt itself since t = 0, the central bank can prevent the chain effect
of crisis. If QE is conducted at t = 1, it is still very effective in comparison to the conventional monetary
policy. Output can be 1.2 percent higher in the unconventional monetary policy in the short run.
Inflation is even recovered more quickly under the unconventional monetary policy in the short run,
even though our model still features the price stickiness in the same line as New Keynesian literature. By
purchasing a massive amount of asset xt , the central bank can create inflation immediately. As Rn is not
adjusted, the prime rate rh decreased sharply following QE. This stimulates the borrowing from households.
The investment, the aggregate demand and the inflation go up as the cash-in-advance constraint is relaxed.
For our first experiment, deflation does not appear in the short run. For the second experiment, after the
sharp deflation in the period t = 0 when the commercial banks cut loans, the inflation goes back immediately
when the central bank purchases xt .
It is, in fact, a challenging task for any New Keynesian models to generate the sharp decline, then
immediately, the sharp rise in the inflation within two periods. Del Negro, Giannoni and Schorfheide
(2015) explain the missing deflation by the rise in the expected marginal cost in the future. Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2015) build a model featuring a working capital channel. The inflation does not
decline much in their model as the higher spread feeds directly on the marginal cost. On the other hand, the
result in our model is the combination of two unexpected shocks. The first unexpected shock is the housing
demand shock ξt at time t = 0, and the second one is the unexpected shock on the central bank’s policy
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Figure 7: Personal Consumption Expenditure Index (Percent Change). Source: BEA
t = 1 when they switch from the conventional monetary policy to the unconventional one. In one period,
inflation goes up by more than 1 percent in the quantitative easing. The economy is out of the deflation
episode immediately while this will last in a long time if the central bank only conducts the conventional
monetary policy.
6.7 Is QE inflationary or deflationary ?
In the short run, the answer is clear that quantitative easing causes the inflation. By purchasing the distressed
asset, the central bank not only injects a lot of reserves in the banking system but also signal to the market
that the federal funds rate will be near zero for a long time. As the result of that, the credit market recovers,
bank issues more loans, and households are willing to borrow more as the real cost of borrowing goes down.
Due to the combination of all these effect, the total amount of money supply ZMDs goes up and creates
inflation. The data from Bureau of Economic Analysis also shows that after quantitative easing, inflation in
US rose up very quickly from -1 percent to its target level 2 percent (Figure 7).
However, our model shows that, in the medium run, if the Fed does not adjust the interest rate paid on
reserves Rn, quantitative easing will cause deflation. Using the definition of the prime rate rht in the previous
section, we can rewrite (22) and (25) in the deterministic setup as:
1
c˜t
= β˜
Rmt
c˜t+1pit+1
+ γt (50)
1
c˜t
= β˜
rht
c˜t+1
+ωt (51)
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From the two above equations, we can rewrite:
Rmt
pit+1
= rht +
c˜t+1(ωt− γt)
β˜
(52)
As the households will smooth their consumption and there is no big change in the liquidity premium of
money as well as the shadow price of borrowing constraint, it can be said that the real rate return of money
(Rmt /pit+1) will move in the same direction with the real prime rate rht in the long run. When the central bank
conducts the quantitative easing, the nominal interest rate on zero maturity deposits is equal to the interest
rate paid on reserves, Rmt = R
f
t = Rn. The tricky part is the real prime rate in our model as the bank loan
is modeled different from the New Keynesian literature. As each period, households only pay a fraction of
the loan they borrow before, bankers have to take into account the interest path in the future. In the perfect
foresight setting, if banker knows that the federal funds rate will go up after 15 year, the loan rate they offer
to households at the current moment already reflects partially that expectation. Figure 6a show that after the
sharp decline, the real prime rate rth slowly increases. As the R
m
t is fixed at the interest rate paid on reserves
Rn, the inflation has to go down to satisfy the equation (52).
Another way of thinking why quantitative easing causes deflation in the medium run is to use the ag-
gregate demand to explain. When the central bank suddenly purchases a large amount of assets from the
bankers’ balance sheet, the wealth is transferred from the households to bankers. What is the mechanism
behind this transfer? Bankers hold zero maturity deposits on the liability side and hold real long-term assets
(loan) on the asset side. So after the short-run effect of quantitative easing, the cost of liability side reduces
substantially while the return on the asset side starts picking up as agents expect the interest will rise again
in the future. In our assumption, the discount rate of banker is higher than the one of households, so aggre-
gate demand will decline when wealth is transferred from households to bankers, resulting in the deflation
in the medium run.
6.8 The interest rate paid on reserves as a monetary policy tool: Rn→ Rnt
When the banking system is awash of reserves, the central bank can still control the federal funds rate by
adjusting the interest rate paid on reserves. As we do not assume that Rn as a constant in this section, we
put a subscript t into the notation to show that the central bank can change that. Before using the numerical
result to weigh the effect of adjusting Rnt , we ask two fundamental questions about using R
n
t as the policy
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tool.
6.8.1 Is adjusting the interbank rate by Rnt similar to the one adjusted by the open market opera-
tion?
Even though both tools can change the federal funds rate, they are not exactly identical. When the central
bank conducts the open market purchase, and the reserves requirement is still binding λ > 0, it not only
reduces the federal funds rate but also increase the level of reserves, and therefore directly increases the
level of money supply (mt/Rmt ) in the economy through the constraint (4). On the other hand, until the
central bank uses payoffs they get from holding the financial instruments on the asset side to pay the interest
rate on reserves for bankers, adjusting the interbank rate by Rnt does not change the level of reserves. It only
changes the money supply indirectly through stimulating the credit flows between bankers and households.
6.8.2 Do banker earn a lot of profit from this policy ?
Under the assumption of our model that banking market is perfectly competitive, the answer is no. When
Rnt goes up, the return on reserves increases. How do the bankers get reserves? The two most basic ways
for bankers to have more reserves in our model is through either borrowing from the interbank market or
receiving more zero maturity deposits. So we can think the interbank rate R ft and the zero maturity deposits
rate Rmt are the cost of obtaining more reserves. In the perfectly competitive market environment when
banking system is awash of reserves, we have R ft = Rmt = R
n
t , so raising the R
n
t does not transfer wealth
from households to bankers as households also receive their fair share through the increase in Rm.
6.8.3 The effect of raising Rnt after QE
In our last experiment in the unconventional monetary policy section, we know that, without adjusting the
federal funds rate by using Rnt , quantitative easing, even though pushes up inflation and output in the short
run, might cause a period of deflation in the medium run as the federal funds rate is near zero for a too long
time. In this section, we do one experiment that central bank will use the interest rate on reserves Rnt to
adjust the R ft after QE. We assume that after 20 periods (around 5 years) since the date of housing crisis
(t = 0), the central bank will slowly increase Rnt from 25 basis points (t = 20) to 414 basis points-the long
run level (t = 50).
There is a trade-off between the short run and the long run when the central bank raises the interest paid
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Figure 8: Comparison QE with and without raising Rn in the period 20th
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on reserves after conducting the quantitative easing. In the deterministic model, raising the Rnt sooner will
reduce the effect of the large scale asset purchase program in the short run. During the period of raising Rnt ,
the economy will go through a slight recession period. However, in the long run period, both inflation and
output are smoother than in the case of quantitative easing without adjusting Rnt .
6.9 Raising money supply and federal funds rate at the same time. Why not ?
In the Keynesian theory, it is impossible to raise the federal fund rate and money supply at the same time.
With electronic money, this task is possible and should be discussed thoroughly as it might be an effective
policy to get out the zero lower bound. As electronic money, in the form of checkable deposits and saving
deposits, earn the nominal interest rate the follows the federal funds rate, theoretically and practically,
central bank can increase the interest rate paid on reserves and money supply at the same time.
For simplicity, assume that the Fed conducts the helicopter money by sending free checks to households
and raises the interest rate on reserves simultaneously5. The balance sheet of the central bank, banks and
private sector will look like Table 7.
The Fed Banks Public
Reserves:+M Reserves:+M Deposits: +M Deposits:+M Net worth: +M
Net worth:-M
Table 7: Helicopter Money
In our paper, the central banks hold the indexed government bonds on the asset side, so helicopter money
will not create any troubles as the values of bonds will be adjusted to the inflation. We still assume that there
is an unexpected housing price shock (t = 0), and an unexpected policy shock at t = 1 when central banks
send free checks to everybody (only at t = 1. Simultaneously, the central bank raises Rnt from 25 basis points
to 350 basis points during 200 periods before returning back to 25 basis points.
For comparison with the previous case, we set the total amount of money drop as τ1 = 0.02xv. The new
set of equations in equilibrium (for t ≥ 1) will be:
Rnt nt−1
pit
+ τt = nt +qt(bgt −bgt−1) (53)
5Legally, the Fed cannot conduct this policy directly. We should think the helicopter money as Money-Financed Fiscal
Program.
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mt
Rmt
=
mt−1
pit
+ f
(
st
bht−1
)
+νbht + rtst−δbbht−1+ ct− xt−1rxt +dt−bgt−1− (Rnt −1)
nt−1
pi
+ τt (54)
nt = ρnnt−1+(1−ρn)
(
n+(Et
[
Rxt+1
]−Rx)) (55)
xt = 1 (56)
The dynamics of the economy is shown in the Figure 9. The inflation responds much stronger in the
helicopter case as the balance sheet of the public expands. By raising the interest rate paid on reserves, the
Fed can partially control the magnitude of the inflation by restricting the flows of credits.
The essential message here is that money supply and the federal funds rate can be controlled by the Fed
at the same time (at least in the short run), which is contradict with the Keynesian theory. Failing to model
the whole banking sector with electronic money gives a incorrect picture about the relationship between
money supply and the interest rate.
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7 Conclusion
E-money, as an inside money issued by commercial banks, play a vital role to understand the modern mon-
etary system. Our objective in this paper is to build a model linking the central bank’s policy instruments
(reserves level, interbank rate, interest rate paid on reserves) to the monetary aggregate (M1) and the real
economic activities. Through the lens of our model, we contribute to the discussion about the Great Reces-
sion and the unconventional monetary policy.
The first important remark is that the financial crisis is extremely dangerous as the central bank might
lose the control of money supply in the short run. A big negative shock to the asset side of banks’ balance
sheets will lead to the deleveraging process, where the conventional monetary policy, by only adjusting the
interbank rate to the lower bound, might not be enough. The private sector will be in the liquidity constraint,
leading to the sharp cut in investment and output.
We find that a quantitative easing program is very powerful to push the economy out of trouble in the
short run. Through the asset price channel, it helps banks out of the capital constraint. Through the bank
lending channel, it helps the private sectors get the credits with the low cost. It can push up inflation imme-
diate in the short run.
However, quantitative easing is a tricky tool that might create deflation and the slow recovery of the
economy in the medium run. They key mechanism for this deflation is the mismatch in the maturity be-
tween money and loan. If the public believes that interest rate will rise in the future, deflation will appear
to balance the real rate return of money to the real rate of loan. Raising the interest rate paid on reserves is
necessary to stabilize the economy in the long run. To avoid the negative effect from raising the interest rate,
the central should simultaneously increase the money supply. This policy is impossible in the Keynesian
theory, but is totally feasible in a new world where electronic money is the main form of payments.
46
References
Abel, Andrew B. 1985. “Dynamic Behavior of Capital Accumulation in a Cash-in-Advance Model.” Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Inc NBER Working Papers 1549.
Afonso, Gara, and Ricardo Lagos. 2015. “Trade Dynamics in the Market for Federal Funds.” Economet-
rica, 83: 263–313.
Becker, William E. 1975. “Determinants of the United States Currency-Demand Deposit Ratio.” The Jour-
nal of Finance, 30(1): 57–74.
Belongia, Michael T., and Peter N. Ireland. 2006. “The Own-Price of Money and the Channels of Mone-
tary Transmission.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38(2): 429–445.
Belongia, Michael T., and Peter N. Ireland. 2014. “The Barnett critique after three decades: A New
Keynesian analysis.” Journal of Econometrics, 183(1): 5–21.
Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist. 1999. “The financial accelerator in a quantitative
business cycle framework.” In Handbook of Macroeconomics. Vol. 1 of Handbook of Macroeconomics, ,
ed. J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford, Chapter 21, 1341–1393. Elsevier.
Bianchi, Javier, and Saki Bigio. 2014. “Banks, Liquidity Management and Monetary Policy.” National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc NBER Working Papers 20490.
Brumm, Johannes, and Simon Scheidegger. 2015. “Using adaptive sparse grids to solve high-dimensional
dynamic models.” SSRN 2349281.
Brunnermeier, Markus, and Yuliy Sannikov. 2016. “The I Theory of Money.” National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Inc NBER Working Papers 22533.
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Alp Simsek. 2013. “Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity.” Journal of Finance,
68(6): 2549–2587.
Cai, Yongyang, Kenneth Judd, and Jevgenijs Steinbuks. 2015. “A Nonlinear Certainty Equivalent Ap-
proximation Method for Dynamic Stochastic Problems.” Quantitative Economics, forthcoming.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Mathias Trabandt. 2015. “Understanding the Great
Recession.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1): 110–67.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Roberto Motto, and Massimo Rostagno. 2004. “The Great Depression and the
Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis.” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper 0318.
Curdia, Vasco, and Michael Woodford. 2011. “The central-bank balance sheet as an instrument of mon-
etarypolicy.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(1): 54–79.
Del Negro, Marco, Marc P. Giannoni, and Frank Schorfheide. 2015. “Inflation in the Great Recession
and New Keynesian Models.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1): 168–96.
Dotsey, Michael. 1983. “An examination of implicit interest rates on demand deposits.” Economic Review,
, (Sep): 3–11.
Friedman, Milton. 1959. “The Demand for Money: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results.” Journal of
Political Economy, 67: 327.
47
Fuerst, Timothy S. 1992. “Liquidity, loanable funds, and real activity.” Journal of Monetary Economics,
29(1): 3–24.
Gertler, Mark, and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki. 2010. “Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business
Cycle Analysis.” In Handbook of Monetary Economics. Vol. 3. 1 ed., , ed. Benjamin M. Friedman and
Michael Woodford, Chapter 11, 547–599. Elsevier.
Gertler, Mark, and Peter Karadi. 2011. “A model of unconventional monetary policy.” Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 58(1): 17–34.
He, Zhiguo, and Arvind Krishnamurthy. 2013. “Intermediary Asset Pricing.” American Economic Re-
view, 103(2): 732–70.
Iacoviello, Matteo. 2005. “House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy in the Business
Cycle.” American Economic Review, 95(3): 739–764.
Judd, Kenneth L., Lilia Maliar, Serguei Maliar, and Rafael Valero. 2014. “Smolyak method for solving
dynamic economic models: Lagrange interpolation, anisotropic grid and adaptive domain.” Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 44(C): 92–123.
Judson, Ruth. 2012. “Crisis and calm: Demand for U.S. currency at home and abroad from the fall of the
Berlin Wall to 2011.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) International Finance
Discussion Papers 1058.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and John Moore. 1997. “Credit Cycles.” Journal of Political Economy, 105(2): 211–
48.
Leland, Hayne, and Klaus Bjerre Toft. 1996. “Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and
the Term Structure of Credit Spreads.” Journal of Finance, 51(3): 987–1019.
Lucas, Robert E, Jr, and Nancy L Stokey. 1987. “Money and Interest in a Cash-in-Advance Economy.”
Econometrica, 55(3): 491–513.
Malin, Benjamin A., Dirk Krueger, and Felix Kubler. 2011. “Solving the multi-country real busi-
ness cycle model using a Smolyak-collocation method.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
35(2): 229–239.
McGrattan, Ellen R. 1996. “Solving the stochastic growth model with a finite element method.” Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 20(1-3): 19–42.
Mitchell, Douglas W. 1979. “Explicit and Implicit Demand Deposit Interest: Substitutes or Complements
from the Bank’s Point of View?” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 11(2): 182–191.
Mulligan, Casey B, and Xavier X Sala-I-Martin. 1997. “The Optimum Quantity of Money: Theory and
Evidence.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29(4): 687–715.
Schreft, Stacey L., and Bruce D. Smith. 2000. “The evolution of cash transactions: Some implications for
monetary policy.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 46(1): 97 – 120.
Startz, Richard. 1979. “Implicit interest on demand deposits.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 5(4): 515–
534.
48
Stockman, Alan C. 1981. “Anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in-advance economy.”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 8(3): 387–393.
Wachter, Andreas, and T. Lorenz Biegler. 2006. “On the implementation of an interior-point filter line-
search algorithm for large-scale nonlinear programming.” Mathematical Programming, 106(1): 25–57.
Wang, Peng-fei, and Yi Wen. 2006. “Another look at sticky prices and output persistence.” Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 30(12): 2533–2552.
49
A Banking Data
Table 8: High Yield Checking Account (Source: Bankrate.com , Mar 2006)
Institution Name APY% Balance Cap ($)
Amegy Bank 0.20 25000
American Bank of Huntsville 0.99 15000
Arizona Bank & Trust 1.51 20000
Atlantic Coast Bank 0.02 20000
Avidia Bank 1.06 25000
Bank of Blue Valley 1.25 15000
Bank of the Wichitas 1.50 10000
BankGloucester 1.51 25000
BTH Bank 2.25 7000
Capital Bank 0.75 10000
Citizens Community Federal 2.00 25000
City National Bank 0.20 None
Community Bank of Pleasant Hill 1.50 10000
Community Bank of Raymore 1.50 10000
Coulee Bank 2.55 15000
Cross Keys Bank 2.05 10000
Farmers Bank & Trust 2.01 25000
First American Bank 1.00 15000
First Bank & Trust 1.01 25000
First Security Bank & Trust 1.05 15000
Heartland Bank 2.00 15000
Heritage Bank 1.26 25000
Jeff Davis Bank 3.25 10000
KANZA Bank 2.00 10000
Lee Bank 2.50 15000
Lee County Bank & Trust, N.A. 1.10 15000
Liberty Bank 1.01 10000
Meredith Village Savings Bank 0.30 25000
NorStates Bank 0.50 None
North Country Savings Bank 1.05 25000
Northpointe Bank 5.00 5000
Ouachita Independent Bank 3.01 15000
Premier Valley Bank 0.31 25000
Royal Banks of Missouri 1.85 24999
Security Bank 2.05 15000
The State Bank of Toledo 0.90 25000
Sutton Bank 1.77 25000
The Bank of Fayetteville 1.00 15000
The Provident Bank (Green Checking) 1.00 1000
The Provident Bank (Smart Checking) 1.51 15000
TriSummit Bank 1.11 25000
West Texas National Bank 1.26 25000
Westfield Bank 2.01 15000
Bank of America 0.02 50000
Citi Bank 0.03 50000
Well Fargo 0.05 50000
JP Morgan Chase 0.01 15000
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B The Sparse Grid
We follow closely Brumm and Scheidegger (2015) to build the “Clenshaw-Curtis” sparse grid. We trans-
form the domain of our state variables into Ω= [0,1]d , where d is the dimensionality of the problem.
Let ~l = (l1, ..., ld) ∈ N and~i = (i1, ..., id) ∈ N denote multi-indexes representing the grid refinement level
and the spatial position of a d-dimensional grid point~x~l,~i. Using this notation, we can define the full grid Ω~l
on Ω with mesh size:
h~l := (hl1 , ...,hld) = 2
−~l :=
(
2−l1 , ...,2−ld
)
(B.1)
and generic grid point:
~x~l,~i := (xl1,x1, ...,xld ,xd) (B.2)
where
xlt ,it := it2
−lt , with it ∈ {0,1, ...,2lt}, and t ∈ {1, ...,d}
Next, we describe about the basis functions. For each grid point~x~l,~i, there is an associated piecewise d-linear
basis function φ~l,~i(~x) defined as the product of the one-dimensional basis functions :
φ~l,~i(~x) :=
d
∏
t=1
φC,Clt ,it (xt) (B.3)
where φC,Clt ,it is defined as:
φC,Clt ,it (xt) =

1 if l = 1 and i = 1
1−2xt if xt ∈ [0, 12 ]
0 else
 if l = 2 and i = 0
2xt−1 if xt ∈ [12 ,1]
0 else
 if l = 2 and i = 2
φlt ,it (xt) else,
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and φlt ,it is the hat function such that:
φlt ,it (z) =

1−
∣∣∣∣∣z− it .2−(lt−1)2−(lt−1)
∣∣∣∣∣ , if z ∈ [(it−1).2−(lt−1),(it +1).2−(lt−1)]
0, else
Now, we are ready to define the sparse grid informally. We want to choose a set of points in the grid,
and as each point represents one basis function (both are denoted by the same pair (~l,~i)), it is equivalent to
choose a set of basis functions to approximate our function. So assume we want to approximate the banker’s
consumption rule c(.) as the function of state variables {n,bg,m,bh,K,ξ}, we can approximate c(.) as the
linear combination of our basis functions. The difficult question is, given the fixed number of grid points
and number of basis functions, how to choose its location in an optimized way.
Given our refinement level n, Clenshaw-Curtis sparse grid will choose all points indexed by (~l,~i) that
satisfy the following two criteria:
(i)
d
∑
t=1
lt ≤ n+d−1
(ii) it ∈ Ilt for 1≤ t ≤ d
where the set Il is defined as:
Il :=

{i : i = 1}, if l = 1
{i : 0≤ i≤ 2, i even}, if l = 2
{i : 1≤ i≤ 2l−1−1, i odd}, else
(B.4)
The more formal introduction to the sparse grid and its application in economics can be found in Malin,
Krueger and Kubler (2011), Judd et al. (2014), Brumm and Scheidegger (2015).
In our paper, we build a sparse grid in the level 4, then adaptively add more grid points into the high
curvature region. Basically, each point in the grid has two children in each dimension, so if the coefficient
attached to the basis function is big (greater than 0.05 in our paper), we add the children of this grid point to
refine this region. Brumm and Scheidegger (2015) provides a thorough introduction to the adaptive sparse
grid and its application in economics.
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C System of Equations in Equilibrium
Bankers:
1
ct
= βR ft Et
[
1
ct+1pit+1
]
+µt (C.1)
1
ct
= βRmt Et
[
1
ct+1pit+1
]
+µt +ϕλt (C.2)
1
ct
= βEt
[
Rxt+1
ct+1pit+1
]
+(1−κ)µt (C.3)
1
ct
= βRnEt
[
1
ct+1pit+1
]
+λt +µt (C.4)
1
ct
= βEt
[
1+qt+1
qtct+1
]
+µt (C.5)
nt−1
pit
= nt +qt(b
g
t −bgt−1) (C.6)
mt
Rmt
=
mt−1
pit
+νbht + rtst−δbbht−1+ ct−bgt−1−qht H− (Rn−1)
nt−1
pit
(C.7)
0≤ λt ⊥
(
nt−ϕ mtRmt
)
≥ 0 (C.8)
0≤ µt ⊥
[
nt +qtb
g
t +(1−κ)
(
bht +Htvt
)
− mt
Rmt
]
≥ 0 (C.9)
bht = (1−δb)bht−1+ st (C.10)
1
ct
(
ν+ rt +
f ′t
bht−1
)
= Et
[
βδb
ct+1
]
+Et
[
β st+1 f ′t+1
ct+1(bht )2
]
+Et
[
β (1−δb)(rt+1bht + f ′t+1)
ct+1bht
]
+(1−κ)µt (C.11)
Housing Sector:
iht = Ht−1 (C.12)
Rxt =
[qht i
h
t +Htvt ]pit
vt−1Ht−1
(C.13)
Households:
1
c˜t
− γt−Λt = 0 (C.14)
Λt = β˜Rmt Et
[
1
c˜t+1pit+1
]
(C.15)
qht
c˜t
=
ξt
h˜t
+ β˜ (1−δ h)Et
[
qht+1
c˜t+1
]
(C.16)
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χ l˜η+1t = (1−α)Λt pmt yt (C.17)
rt
c˜t
= β˜ δbEt
[
1
c˜t+1
]
+ β˜ (1−δb)Et
[
rt+1
c˜t+1
]
+ωt (C.18)
1
c˜t
= β˜ (1−δ )Et
[
1
c˜t+1
]
+ β˜Et
[
αΛt+1 pmt+1yt+1
Kt
]
(C.19)
0≤ ωt ⊥ [bh−bht ]≥ 0 (C.20)
Retail Firm:
1− ι (pit−1)+ ιβ˜Et
[
Λt+1
Λt
(pit+1−1)pit+1 yt+1yt
]
= (1− pmt )θ (C.21)
yt = Kαt−1l
1−α
t (C.22)
Central bank:
R ft = R f +φn
(
nt− (1−ρn)n−ρnnt−1
n
)
+φpi(pit−pi)+φy(log(yst )− log(ys)) (C.23)
Market Clearing:
yt = ct + c˜t + It +νbht + f
(
st
bht−1
)
+
γ
2
(pit−1)2 yt (C.24)
Ht = H (C.25)
ht =
H
δh
(C.26)
Kt = (1−δ )Kt−1+ It (C.27)
log(ξt) = (1−ρx) log(ξ )+ρξ log(ξt−1)+ εt (C.28)
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